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Abstract
Background: Military members, injured in Afghanistan or Iraq, have returned home with multi-
drug resistant Acinetobacter baumannii infections. The source of these infections is unknown.
Methods: Retrospective study of all Canadian soldiers who were injured in Afghanistan and who
required mechanical ventilation from January 1 2006 to September 1 2006. Patients who developed
A. baumannii ventilator associated pneumonia (VAP) were identified. All A. baumannii isolates were
retrieved for study patients and compared with A. baumannii isolates from environmental sources
from the Kandahar military hospital using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE).
Results: During the study period, six Canadian Forces (CF) soldiers were injured in Afghanistan,
required mechanical ventilation and were repatriated to Canadian hospitals. Four of these patients
developed A. baumannii VAP. A. baumannii was also isolated from one environmental source in
Kandahar – a ventilator air intake filter. Patient isolates were genetically indistinguishable from each
other and from the isolates cultured from the ventilator filter. These isolates were resistant to
numerous classes of antimicrobials including the carbapenems.
Conclusion: These results suggest that the source of A. baumannii infection for these four patients
was an environmental source in the military field hospital in Kandahar. A causal linkage, however,
was not established with the ventilator. This study suggests that infection control efforts and
further research should be focused on the military field hospital environment to prevent further
multi-drug resistant A. baumannii infections in injured soldiers.
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Background
Acinetobacter baumannii is a gram-negative bacterium that
can cause infectious outbreaks in critically-ill patients,
often with limited treatment options due to antibiotic
resistance [1-3]. In November, 2004, the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported an increas-
ing number of multi-drug resistant (MDR) A. baumannii
bloodstream infections in United States military person-
nel returning from service in Iraq and Afghanistan [4]. The
source of these infections is unknown. We report the
results of an infection control investigation of four Cana-
dian Forces members who developed ventilator associ-
ated pneumonia (VAP) from MDR A. baumannii after
injury in Afghanistan.
Methods
In November 2005, Canadian Forces (CF) members
deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Surgical support was
provided by the 248th Combat Support Hospital, a US
medical unit. However, a Canadian-led medical unit
(Role Three Multinational Medical Unit (R3MMU))
assumed command of the facility on February 7, 2006.
Two of the authors (HCT and AB) were part of the first
Canadian medical contingent to arrive at this facility in
Kandahar. Three mechanical ventilators (iVent201, Ver-
samed Inc, Pearl River, NY) were purchased from the
departing US organization, and were left in the facility for
use by the R3MMU. At the time of the hand-over, this
facility had 11 beds in a small, common room. The inten-
sive care unit consisted of three of these beds which were
equipped with the iVent ventilators. The R3MMU has
basic laboratory support, but does not have any microbio-
logical testing capability.
While working at this hospital, the authors (HT and AB)
treated a Canadian soldier (patient one) who suffered a
severe head injury and required mechanical ventilation.
After this patient was evacuated back to Canada, they were
informed that he developed MDR A. baumannii VAP. As a
result, they took environmental samples from inside and
around the hospital. These included numerous soil sam-
ples from around the operating room, ICU and resuscita-
tion bay. Because the hospital did not have
microbiological testing capabilities, they collected all
samples using sterile forceps or sterile basins, and placed
them into sterile specimen containers. Also, they disman-
tled the patient's (patient one) mechanical ventilator, and
collected samples (including the air intake filter) from it
using sterile forceps and specimen containers. These were
all couriered to microbiology laboratories in Canadian
hospitals for testing. The samples arrived in Canada
approximately 72 hours after collection.
Several months after returning to Canada, the
authors(HCT & AB) then identified all CF members who
were injured in Kandahar and who required mechanical
ventilation using aeromedical evacuation records
(obtained through the Canadian Forces Health Services)
from 1 January 2006 to 1 September 2007. In general,
injured CF members are evacuated by US Air Force medi-
cal teams to a US army hospital in Germany (Landstuhl
Regional Medical Center or LRMC). Canadian medical
teams then bring casualties from LRMC to civilian Cana-
dian hospitals. During the study period time, CF members
were repatriated to five different civilian tertiary care cent-
ers in Canada.
We reviewed the medical records of these patients from
Kandahar, LRMC and their respective Canadian hospitals,
if available. We also contacted the attending physicians
responsible for each patient in Canada to discuss each
patient's clinical course in hospital. We also contacted the
microbiology department of LRMC and all involved
Canadian hospitals to obtain the microbiological record
for each patient. Our primary outcome of interest was the
development of A. baumannii ventilator associated pneu-
monia, as defined by the CDC's National Nosocomial
Infection Surveillance system [5]. A. baumannii respiratory
isolates were then retrieved, if available, for all patients
who developed A. baumannii VAP. Patient isolates were
then compared to each other, and to any positive environ-
mental isolates from the hospital in Kandahar.
Organisms were identified using standard laboratory
methods, including Gram stain appearance, colonial mor-
phology, negative oxidase reaction, and the VITEK-2 ID-
GNB card (bioMérieux, Hazelwood, MO). Antibiotic sus-
ceptibility testing was done using the VITEK-2 AST-N019
card according to the manufacturer's instructions
(bioMérieux). Genomic DNA from all A. baumannii iso-
lates was digested with ApaI for molecular typing by PFGE
[6]. Interpretation of DNA profiles generated by PFGE was
done visually. Isolates were considered to be genetically
related if their PFGE patterns differed by three of fewer
bands [7].
Institutional review ethics approval was obtained to con-
duct this study. However, individual consent was not
obtained from each patient as some had been already dis-
charged from hospital. As the number of critically
wounded CF casualties was small during the study period,
we only present aggregate demographic data (means ±
standard deviation), as individual information may iden-
tify specific patients. Statistical analysis was performed
using SAS version 8.02 (SAS Institute, Carey, NC).
Results
During the study period, six CF members required
mechanical ventilation and were evacuated through
LRMC to five different Canadian hospitals. Four of theseBMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:95 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/95
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patients developed multi-drug resistant A. baumannii VAP.
Their mean age was 26.5 years (± 8.5). Three sustained
multiple injuries from improvised explosive devices; one
received a severe head injury. On average, they required
68 days of mechanical ventilation (± 70 days).
During this same period of time, a total of 42 injured CF
members were evacuated from Kandahar to Canadian
hospitals, through Landstuhl Regional Medical Centre.
On review of the A. baumannii screening results from
LRMC (which was performed shortly after admission),
there were skin culture reports found for 25 of these
patients; reports were not found for 17. Only two patients
had positive screening tests that were positive for A. bau-
mannii (preliminary, non-published results). One of the
positive screening tests was from one of the four study
patients (patient one). Unfortunately, the isolate was not
available for testing by PFGE.
The A. baumannii respiratory isolates retrieved from Cana-
dian hospitals and from LRMC for these four patients
were molecularly identical based on the PFGE (See Figure
1). For patient one, a multi-drug resistant strain of A. bau-
mannii was cultured from a bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL)
specimen obtained five days post injury at LRMC. The BAL
was done for signs and symptoms suggesting VAP, includ-
ing a fever and an infiltrate on chest radiography. This
strain of A. baumannii persisted in respiratory samples iso-
lated from the Canadian hospital. The A. baumannii iso-
lates for patients two and three, obtained from LRMC on
post-injury days ten and twelve respectively were multi-
drug resistant and identical to the multi-drug resistant
strain from patient one (Figure 1). Both patients were
showing signs of VAP (fever and infiltrates on chest radi-
ography) at the time of these positive cultures. These same
strains were also cultured from respiratory samples from
patients two and three in their respective Canadian hospi-
tals. A. baumannii respiratory isolates from patient four,
cultured two weeks post injury in Canada were also iden-
tical to this multi-drug resistant strain (Figure 1). Patient
four also had clinical and radiological signs of VAP, at the
time of this positive result. Respiratory isolates from
LRMC for patient four were negative for A. baumannii.
A. baumannii was not isolated from any environmental
samples, except from one ventilator air intake filter sam-
ple from Kandahar. This filter isolate was also multi-drug
resistant, and identical to the MDR strain obtained from
all four patients in LRMC and Canada. The antibiogram
for the A. baumannii strains isolated from all four patients
at their various hospitals showed identical antibiotic sus-
ceptibilities (See Table 1).
Discussion
We report four cases of multi-drug resistant A. baumannii
infections in CF members injured in Afghanistan. MDR A.
baumannii VAP was first diagnosed in three of these four
patients at the US army hospital in Landstuhl, Germany
and continued to be an issue for them in Canada. Patient
four developed A. baumannii VAP while hospitalized in
Canada. Originally, we suspected that the source of these
infections was LRMC, as all four patients had molecularly
identical strains of MDR A. baumannii VAP, and all four
had been treated at LRMC where MDR A. baumannii infec-
tions are prevalent. However, the filter isolate was also
identical to the MDR A. baumannii isolated from these
four patients, suggesting that the field hospital was the
original source of infection.
We were only able to demonstrate A. baumannii in one
environmental sample – the ventilator filter isolate. If the
field hospital were contaminated, we would expect fairly
widespread contamination and therefore, would have
expected multiple environmental samples to have been
positive for A. baumannii. However, as mentioned previ-
ously, the R3MMU field hospital does not have microbio-
logical testing capability; therefore, all samples were
couriered to Canada for culture. This resulted in a delay of
at least 72 hours prior to processing; this delay may be
responsible for the low yield of positive cultures in our
environmental samples.
The origin of the A. baumannii infections in soldiers
injured in Afghanistan and Iraq is still unknown. These
infections may have been acquired from environmental
sources in the field, during treatment at military field hos-
pitals, during evacuation from the theatre of operations,
or during treatment at hospitals outside of the conflict
area. During the Vietnam War, A. baumannii was recovered
from traumatic injuries to extremities [8]. More recent
reports have also identified A. baumannii infections in
patients who suffered traumatic injuries, suggesting envi-
ronmental contamination of wounds as a potential source
[9]. Our report also suggests that these MDR A. baumannii
organisms originated from an environmental source in
the theatre of operations. All MDR A. baumannii isolates
from these four patients were molecularly identical to the
ventilator filter isolate from Kandahar.
A. baumannii has often been linked to infectious out-
breaks involving the mechanical ventilation circuit [10-
12]. However, this study does not definitively establish a
causal link between the contaminated ventilator in Kan-
dahar and the subsequent four cases of MDR A. baumannii
VAP. A. baumannii is a ubiquitous micro-organism that
colonizes inanimate surfaces and medical equipment.
Our patients may have just as easily acquired the MDR A.
baumannii through lack of hand hygiene in health work-BMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:95 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/95
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ers, microaspiration or even hematogenous spread from
an infected IV site. Once acquired, the ventilator may have
been secondarily contaminated.
Unfortunately, because of limitations of the field environ-
ment, we were unable to trace contact exposures of
infected patients back to specific health care workers.
Because of limitations in personnel, patients were not
assigned to specific health care workers; instead, two to
three nurses were on duty for each shift, and collectively
cared for all patients in the facility. As a result, all patients
were exposed to all health care workers because of the
small numbers of hospital staff. Likewise, we were unable
to screen the hands of hospital health care workers, as the
facility did not have microbiological testing capability.
Even so, the results of this report suggest that the field hos-
pital environment is the source of MDR A. baumannii
DNA fingerprint profiles of Acinetobacter baumannii after ApaI-digested pulsed-field gel electrophoresis Figure 1
DNA fingerprint profiles of Acinetobacter baumannii after ApaI-digested pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. Lanes 1 
and 12: Lambda DNA ladder (New England Biolabs, Mississauga, ON) Lanes 2 and 11: Unrelated A. baumannii strains Lane 3: 
Patient 1 (bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) from LRMC) Lane 4: Patient 1 (Tracheal aspirate, Canada) Lane 5: Patient 2 (Tracheal 
aspirate, LRMC) Lane 6: Patient 2 (Tracheal aspirate, Canada) Lane 7: Patient 3 (Tracheal aspirate, LRMC) Lane 8: Patient 3 
(BAL, Canada) Lane 9: Patient 4 (BAL, Canada) Lane 10: A. baumannii isolate from air intake filter, Kandahar.
1     2   3     4    5    6     7    8    9    10  11  12BMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:95 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/95
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infections and that increased infection control measures
are required at the field hospital level in military theatre
of operations. For example, regular ventilator cleaning
and maintenance is difficult in the field setting, and out-
going staff from the 248th CSH reported that air-intake fil-
ters and antibacterial circuit filters were difficult to obtain.
As a result, antibacterial circuit filters were not routinely
used, and the air-intake filters were not routinely changed.
Based on our findings, the ventilators are now regularly
maintained, and air-intake filters are changed as recom-
mended by the manufacturer. Anti-bacterial circuit filters
are also now used (Intersurgical Filta-Therm Filter, Inter-
surgical Ltd, Wokingham Berkshire UK). As well, hospital
cleaners have been hired and hand-washing stations have
been established in patient care areas.
Our findings are likely applicable to US and British mili-
tary field hospitals as well. Our ventilators were previ-
ously used by the 248th CSH. As well, the environmental
and logistical problems that faced both the 248th CSH and
the R3MMU are common across field hospitals in Afghan-
istan and Iraq [13,14]. Other contributory factors may
have included non-restrictive antibiotic use at the field
hospitals to compensate for poor environmental condi-
tions [13].
Identifying the etiology of multi-drug resistant Acineto-
bacter infection in returning soldiers is important for pre-
venting nosocomial transmission to other vulnerable
patients. Zapor reported 53 cases of nosocomial transmis-
sion of MDR Acinetobacter that have directly resulted in
four fatalities in US military hospitals [15]. Jones has also
reported on one British service member who may have
imported an MDR A.  baumannii  strain from Iraq that
caused a large outbreak in National Health Service hospi-
tals in the UK [14].
Ongoing surveillance remains critical for monitoring the
efficacy of infection control measures. In Canada, criti-
cally injured service members are cared for in the civilian
health care system. As a result, the Canadian Forces Health
Services is collaborating with the Public Health Agency of
Canada (PHAC) to implement a national surveillance
strategy for MDR Acinetobacter infections in injured sol-
diers. The multinational nature of military coalitions and
medical care, however, highlight the need for health care
providers to also communicate across national borders.
Conclusion
We conclude that the military field hospital was the
source of multi-drug resistant A. baumannii that later lead
to the development of ventilator associated pneumonia in
four CF members who were injured in Kandahar, Afghan-
istan. Further research and infection control efforts should
be focused on the field hospital environment to prevent
future A. baumannii infections.
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